Abstract. Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on systems security. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information leakage is the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information depending on the system execution time. We address the following problem: given a timed system, synthesize the execution times for which one cannot deduce whether the system performed some secret behavior. We solve this problem in the setting of timed automata (TAs). We first provide a general solution, and then extend the problem to parametric TAs, by synthesizing internal timings making the TA secure. We study decidability, devise algorithms, and show that our method can also apply to program analysis.
Introduction
Timed systems combine concurrency and possibly hard real-time constraints. Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on the security of such systems. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information leakage is the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information depending on timing information. In this work, we focus on the execution time, i. e., when a system works as an almost black-box, with the ability of an attacker to mainly observe its execution time.
We address the following problem: given a timed system, a private state denoting the execution of some secret behavior and a final state denoting the completion of the execution, synthesize the execution times to the final state for which one cannot deduce whether the system has passed through the private state. We solve this problem in the setting of timed automata (TAs), which is a popular extension of finite-state automata with clocks [AD94] . We first prove that this problem is solvable, and we provide an algorithm, that we implement and apply to a set of benchmarks containing notably a set of Java programs known for their (absence of) timing information leakage.
Then we consider a higher-level problem by allowing (internal) timing parameters in the system, that can model uncertainty or unknown constants at early design stage. The setting becomes parametric timed automata [AHV93] , and the problem asks: given a timed system with timing parameters, a private state and a final state, synthesize the timing parameters and the execution times for which one cannot deduce whether the system has passed through the private state. Although we show that the problem is in general undecidable, we provide a decidable subclass; then we devise a general procedure not guaranteed to terminate, but that behaves well on examples from the literature.
Outline After reviewing related works in Section 2, Section 3 recalls necessary concepts and Section 4 introduces the problem. Section 5 addresses timedopacity for timed automata. We then address the parametric version of timedopacity, with theory studied in Section 6, algorithmic in Section 7 and experiments in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Related works
This work is closely related to the line of work on defining and analyzing information flow in timed automata. It is well-known (see e. g., [Koc96; FS00; BB07; Kot+13; Ben+15a]) that time is a potential attack vector against secure systems. That is, it is possible that a non-interferent (secure) system can become interferent (insecure) when timing constraints are added [GMR07] . In [Bar+02; BT03] , a first notion of timed non-interference is proposed. In [GMR07] , Gardey et al. define timed strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI) based on timed language equivalence between the automaton with hidden low-level actions and the automaton with removed low-level actions. Furthermore, they show that the problem of determining whether a timed automaton satisfies SNNI is undecidable. In contrast, timed cosimulation-based SNNI, timed bisimulation-based SNNI and timed state SNNI are decidable. In [Cas09] , the problem of checking opacity for timed automata is considered: even for the restricted class of eventrecording automata [AFH99] , it is undecidable whether a system is opaque, i. e., whether an attacker can deduce whether some set of actions was performed, by only observing a given set of observable actions (with their timing). In [VNN18] , Vasilikos et al. define the security of timed automata in term of information flow using a bisimulation relation and develop an algorithm for deriving a sound constraint for satisfying the information flow property locally based on relevant transitions. In [Ben+15a] , Benattar et al. study the control synthesis problem of timed automata for SNNI. That is, given a timed automaton, they propose a method to automatically generate a (largest) sub-systems such that it is noninterferent if possible. Different from the above-mentioned work, our work considers parametric timed automata, i. e., timed systems with unknown design parameters, and focuses on synthesizing parameter valuations which guarantee information flow property. As far as we know, this is the first work on parametric model checking for timed automata for information flow property. Compared to [Ben+15a] , our approach is more realistic as it does not require change of program structure. Rather, our result provides guidelines on how to choose the timing parameters (e. g., how long to wait after certain program statements) for avoiding information leakage.
In [NNV17] , the authors propose a type system dealing with non-determinism and (continuous) real-time, the adequacy of which is ensured using noninterference. We share the common formalism of TA; however, we mainly focus on leakage as execution time, and we synthesize internal parts of the system (clock guards), in contrast to [NNV17] where the system is fixed. 
Preliminaries
In this work, we assume a system is modeled in the form of a parametric timed automaton. 
Clocks, parameters and guards
We assume a set X = {x 1 , . . . , x H } of clocks, i. e., real-valued variables that evolve at the same rate. A clock valuation is a function µ : X → R ≥0 . We write 0 for the clock valuation assigning 0 to all clocks.
We assume a set P = {p 1 , . . . , p M } of parameters, i. e., unknown constants. A parameter valuation v is a function v : P → Q + . We assume ⊲⊳ ∈ {<, ≤, =, ≥, >}. A guard g is a constraint over X ∪ P defined by a conjunction of inequalities of the form x ⊲⊳ 1≤i≤M α i p i + d, with p i ∈ P, and α i , d ∈ Z. Given g, we write µ |= v(g) if the expression obtained by replacing each x with µ(x) and each p with v(p) in g evaluates to true.
Parametric timed automata
Parametric timed automata (PTA) extend timed automata with parameters within guards and invariants in place of integer constants [AHV93] .
Definition 1 (PTA).
A PTA A is a tuple A = (Σ, L, ℓ 0 , X, P, I, E), where:
1. Σ is a finite set of actions, 2. L is a finite set of locations, 3. ℓ 0 ∈ L is the initial location, 4. X is a finite set of clocks, 5. P is a finite set of parameters, 6. I is the invariant, assigning to every ℓ ∈ L a guard I(ℓ), 7. E is a finite set of edges e = (ℓ, g, a, R, ℓ ′ ) where ℓ, ℓ ′ ∈ L are the source and target locations, a ∈ Σ, R ⊆ X is a set of clocks to be reset, and g is a guard. Example 1. Consider the PTA in Fig. 1 (inspired by [GMR07, Fig. 1b] ), containing one clock x and two parameters p 1 and p 2 . ℓ 0 is the initial location, while ℓ 1 is the (only) accepting location.
Given a parameter valuation v, we denote by v(A) the non-parametric structure where all occurrences of a parameter p i have been replaced by v(p i ). We denote as a timed automaton any structure v(A), by assuming a rescaling of the constants: by multiplying all constants in v(A) by the least common multiple of their denominators, we obtain an equivalent (integer-valued) TA, as defined in [AD94] .
Synchronized product of PTAs The synchronous product (using strong broadcast, i. e., synchronization on a given set of actions), or parallel composition, of several PTAs gives a PTA.
Definition 2 (synchronized product of PTAs). Let N ∈ N. Given a set of
, and a set of actions Σ s , the synchronized product of A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , denoted by A 1 Σs A 2 Σs · · · Σs A N , is the tuple (Σ, L, ℓ 0 , X, P, I, E), where:
and E is defined as follows. For all a ∈ Σ, let ζ a be the subset of indices i ∈ 1, . . . , N such that a ∈ Σ i . For all a ∈ Σ, for all (ℓ 1 , .
That is, synchronization is only performed on Σ s , and other actions are interleaved.
Concrete semantics of TAs Let us now recall the concrete semantics of TA.
Definition 3 (Semantics of a TA). Given a PTA A = (Σ, L, ℓ 0 , X, P, I, E), and a parameter valuation v, the semantics of v(A) is given by the timed transition system (TTS) (S, s 0 , →), with
-→ consists of the discrete and (continuous) delay transition relations:
1. discrete transitions:
and there exists e = (ℓ, g, a, R, ℓ ′ ) ∈ E, such that µ ′ = [µ] R , and µ |= v(g).
delay transitions:
Moreover we write (ℓ, µ)
for a combination of a delay and discrete −→ s i+1 . The duration of a finite run ρ :
, we say that s is reachable in v(A) if s appears in a run of v(A). By extension, we say that ℓ is reachable; and by extension again, given a set T of locations, we say that T is reachable if there exists ℓ ∈ T such that ℓ is reachable in v(A). Given ℓ, ℓ ′ ∈ L and a run ρ, we say that ℓ is reachable on the way to ℓ ′ in ρ if ρ is of the form
Example 2. Consider again the PTA A in Fig. 1 , and let v be such that v(p 1 ) = 1 and v(p 2 ) = 2. Consider the following run ρ of v(A): (ℓ 0 , x = 0), (e 2 , 1.4), (ℓ 2 , x = 1.4), (e 3 , 1.3), (ℓ 1 , x = 2.7), where e 2 is the edge from ℓ 0 to ℓ 2 in Fig. 1 , and e 3 is the edge from ℓ 2 to ℓ 1 . We write "x = 1.4" instead of "µ such that µ(x) = 1.4". We have dur (ρ) = 1.4 + 1.3 = 2.7. In addition, ℓ 2 is reachable on the way to ℓ 1 in ρ.
Symbolic semantics
Let us now recall the symbolic semantics of PTAs (see e. g., [Hun+02] ).
Constraints
We first need to define operations on constraints. A linear term over X ∪ P is of the form 1≤i≤H α i x i + 1≤j≤M β j p j + d, with x i ∈ X, p j ∈ P, and α i , β j , d ∈ Z. A constraint C (i. e., a convex polyhedron) over X ∪ P is a conjunction of inequalities of the form lt ⊲⊳ 0, where lt is a linear term.
Given a parameter valuation v, v(C) denotes the constraint over X obtained by replacing each parameter p in C with v(p). Likewise, given a clock valuation µ, µ(v(C)) denotes the expression obtained by replacing each clock x in v(C) with µ(x). We say that v satisfies C, denoted by v |= C, if the set of clock valuations satisfying v(C) is nonempty. Given a parameter valuation v and a clock valuation µ, we denote by µ|v the valuation over X ∪ P such that for all clocks x, µ|v(x) = µ(x) and for all parameters p, µ|v(p) = v(p). We use the notation µ|v |= C to indicate that µ(v(C)) evaluates to true. We say that C is satisfiable if ∃µ, v s.t. µ|v |= C.
We define the time elapsing of C, denoted by C ր , as the constraint over X and P obtained from C by delaying all clocks by an arbitrary amount of time. That is, Given R ⊆ X, we define the reset of C, denoted by [C] R , as the constraint obtained from C by resetting the clocks in R, and keeping the other clocks unchanged. We denote by C↓ P the projection of C onto P, i. e., obtained by eliminating the variables not in P (e. g., using Fourier-Motzkin [Sch99] ).
Definition 4 (Symbolic state). A symbolic state is a pair (ℓ, C) where ℓ ∈ L is a location, and C its associated parametric zone.
Definition 5 (Symbolic semantics). Given a PTA A = (Σ, L, ℓ 0 , X, P, I, E), the symbolic semantics of A is the labeled transition system called parametric zone graph PZG = (E, S, s 0 , ⇒), with
, and
That is, in the parametric zone graph, nodes are symbolic states, and arcs are labeled by edges of the original PTA.
If (ℓ, C), e, (ℓ ′ , C ′ ) ∈ ⇒, we write Succ(s, e) = (ℓ ′ , C ′ ). By extension, we write Succ(s) for ∪ e∈E Succ(s, e).
Example 3. Consider again the PTA A in Fig. 1 . The parametric zone graph of A is given in Fig. 2 , where e 1 is the edge from ℓ 0 to ℓ 1 in Fig. 1 , e 2 is the edge from ℓ 0 to ℓ 2 , and e 3 is the edge from ℓ 2 to ℓ 1 . In addition, the symbolic states are:
Reachability synthesis
We will use reachability synthesis to solve the problems in Section 4. This procedure, called EFsynth, takes as input a PTA A and a set of target locations T , and attempts to synthesize all parameter valuations v for which T is reachable in v(A). EFsynth(A, T ) was formalized in e. g., [JLR15] and is a procedure that may not terminate, but that computes an exact result (sound and complete) if it terminates. EFsynth traverses the parametric zone graph of A. We finally recall the correctness of EFsynth.
Lemma 1 ([JLR15]
). Let A be a PTA, and let T be a subset of the locations of A. Assume EFsynth(A, T ) terminates with result K.
Timed-opacity problems
Let us first introduce two key concepts to define our notion of opacity. DReach
) is the set of the durations of the runs for which ℓ is reachable (resp. unreachable) on the way to ℓ ′ . Formally:
Example 5. Consider again the PTA in Fig. 1 , and let v be such that v(p 1 ) = 1 and v(p 2 ) = 2. We have DReach
Definition 6 (timed opacity w.r.t. D). Given a TA v(A), a private location ℓ priv , a target location ℓ f and a set of execution times D, we say that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for execution times
Example 6. Consider the PTA A in Fig. 3 where cl is a clock, while ǫ, p are parameters. We use a sightly extended PTA syntax: read?x reads the value input on a given channel read, and assigns it to a (discrete, global) variable x. secret is a constant variable of arbitrary value. If both x and secret are finite-domain variables (e. g., bounded integers) then they can be seen as syntactic sugar for locations. Such variables are supported by most model checkers, including Uppaal and IMITATOR.
This PTA encodes a server process from the DARPA Space/Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) library 1 , that compares a user-input variable with a given secret and performs different actions taking different times depending on this secret.The Java code is given in Appendix A. In our encoding, a single instruction takes a time in [0, ǫ], while p is a (parametric) factor to one of the sleep instructions of the program (originally, v(p) = 2). For sake of simplicity, we abstract away instructions not related to time, and merge subfunctions calls. 
Computation problems
We can now define the timed-opacity computation problem, which consists in computing the possible execution times ensuring opacity w.r.t. a private location. In other words, the attacker model is as follows: the attacker has only access to the computation time between the start of the program and the time it reaches a given (final) location.
Timed-opacity Computation Problem:
Input: A TA v(A), a private location ℓ priv , a target location ℓ f Problem: Compute the execution times D for which v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for execution times D The synthesis counterpart allows for a higher-level problem by also synthesizing the internal timings guaranteeing opacity.
Timed-opacity Synthesis Problem:
Input: A PTA A, a private location ℓ priv , a target location ℓ f Problem: Synthesize the parameter valuations v and the execution times D for which v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for execution times D Note that the execution times can depend on the parameter valuations.
5 Timed-opacity computation for timed automata 5.1 Answering the timed-opacity computation problem Proposition 1 (timed-opacity computation). The timed-opacity computation problem is solvable for TAs.
Proof. Let A be a TA. We aim at exhibiting the execution times D for which A is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for D. We show in the following that this can be obtained from the region graph, the construction of which is EXPSPACE for timed automata [AD94] .
We modify the TA as follows. First, let us add a new clock x abs , which is never reset in the TA. Second, we add a Boolean discrete variable b, initially false. Recall that discrete variables over a finite domain are syntactic sugar for locations: therefore, ℓ f with b = false and ℓ f with b = true can be seen as two different locations. Then, we set b := true on any transition leading to ℓ priv ; therefore, b = true denotes that ℓ priv has been visited.
We can now compute DReach
ℓpriv (ℓ f ) from the region graph of this modified TA, i. e., values of x abs reaching ℓ f with b = false (resp. b = true), as follows. For each region the discrete part of which is ℓ f with b = false (resp. b = true), gather the clock constraints; they come in the form of an integer part, and constraints on the fractional parts of the form x i − x j ∼ c or x i ∼ c or −x i ∼ c for ∼ ∈ {<, ≤} and c ∈ N. We then apply variable elimination by existential quantification to keep only constraints over x abs and obtain the set of (integer and fractional) valuations of x abs such that ℓ f with b = false (resp. b = true) is reachable. Recall that, from the region graph semantics [AD94] , the integer part can take a finite number of values, thanks to the use of an extrapolation (in its simplest form, all integer values below k must be enumerated, while values above k are in the same equivalence class-where k is the largest integer constant of the TA). This gives a finite graph, and therefore the values of x abs reaching ℓ f with b = false (resp. b = true) can be represented as a finite set of (possibly punctual) intervals.
After computing DReach v(A)
¬ℓpriv (ℓ f ) and DReach v(A) ℓpriv (ℓ f ), we can directly apply Definition 6: we perform the intersection of the valuations of x abs for which ℓ f with b = false is reachable together with these for which ℓ f with b = true is reachable, which gives the maximum set of execution times D for which v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for execution times D.
Finally note that, while correct in theory, our construction could be largely improved in practice with the zone graph construction with appropriate extrapolations (e. g., [Beh+06; HSW16] ). Also note that our practical method will be different from this proof, reducing to reachability in a parametric model. This positive result can be put in perspective with the negative result of [Cas09] , that proves that it is undecidable whether a TA (and even the more restricted subclass of event-recording automata [AFH99] ) is opaque, in a sense that the attacker can deduce some actions, by looking at observable actions together with their timing. The difference in our setting is that only the global time is observable, which can be seen as a single action, occurring once only at the end of the computation. In other words, our attacker is less powerful than the attacker in [Cas09] .
Checking for timed-opacity
If one does not have the ability to tune the system (i. e., change internal delays, or add some sleep() or Wait() statements in the program), one may be first interested in knowing whether the system is opaque for all execution times.
Definition 7 (timed opacity). Given a TA v(A), a private location ℓ priv and a target location ℓ f , we say that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f if DReach
That
As we have a procedure to compute DReach 
Decidability and undecidability
We address here the following decision problem, that asks about the emptiness of the parameter valuations and execution times set guaranteeing timed opacity.
Timed-opacity Emptiness Problem:
Input: A PTA A, a private location ℓ priv , a target location ℓ f Problem: Is the set of valuations v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for a non-empty set of execution times empty?
Dually, we are interested in deciding whether there exists at least one parameter valuation for which v(A) is opaque for at least some execution time.
Undecidability in general
With the rule of thumb that all non-trivial decision problems are undecidable for general PTAs [And19] , the following result is not surprising, and follows from the undecidability of reachability-emptiness for PTAs.
Proposition 2 (undecidability). The timed-opacity emptiness problem is undecidable for general PTAs.
Proof. We reduce from the reachability-emptiness problem, i. e., the existence of a parameter valuation reaching a given location in a PTA, which is undecidable [AHV93; Mil00; Doy07; JLR15 
Syntax of L/U-PTAs
Definition 8 (L/U-PTA). An L/U-PTA is a PTA where the set of parameters is partitioned into lower-bound parameters and upper-bound parameters, where each upper-bound (resp. lower-bound) parameter p i must be such that, for every guard or invariant constraint x ⊲⊳ 1≤i≤M α i p i + d, we have: α i > 0 implies ⊲⊳ ∈ {≤, <} (resp. ⊲⊳ ∈ {≥, >}).
Example 8. The PTA in Fig. 1 is an L/U-PTA with {p 1 , p 2 } as lower-bound parameters, and ∅ as upper-bound parameters. The PTA in Fig. 3 is not an L/U-PTA, because p is compared to cl both as a lower-bound (in "p × 32 2 ≤ cl") and as an upper-bound ("cl ≤ p × 32 2 + ǫ").
Theorem 1 (decidability).
The timed-opacity emptiness problem is decidable for L/U-PTAs.
Proof. We reduce to the timed-opacity computation problem of a given TA, which is decidable (Proposition 1). Let A be an L/U-PTA. Let A 0,∞ denote the structure obtained as follows: any occurrence of a lower-bound parameter is replaced with 0, and any occurrence of a conjunct x ⊳ p (where p is necessarily a upper-bound parameter) is deleted, i. e., replaced with true.
Let us show that the set of valuations v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for a non-empty set of execution times is non empty iff the solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A 0,∞ is non-empty.
⇒ Assume there exists a valuation v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for a non-empty set of execution. Therefore, the solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A 0,∞ is non-empty. That is, there exists a duration d such that there exists a run of duration d such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f , and there exists a run of duration d such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f . We now need the following monotonicity property of L/U-PTAs:
Let A be an L/U-PTA and v be a parameter valuation. Let v ′ be a valuation such that for each upper-bound parameter p
Then any run of v(A) is a run of v ′ (A).
Therefore, from Lemma 2, the runs of v(A) of duration d such that ℓ priv is reachable (resp. unreachable) on the way to ℓ f are also runs of A 0,∞ . Therefore, there exists a non-empty set of durations such that A 0,∞ is opaque, i. e., solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A 0,∞ is non-empty. ⇐ Assume the solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A 0,∞ is non-empty. That is, there exists a duration d such that there exists a run of duration d such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f in A 0,∞ , and there exists a run of duration d such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f in A 0,∞ . The result could follow immediately-if only assigning 0 and ∞ to parameters was a proper parameter valuation. From [Hun+02; BL09], if a location is reachable in the TA obtained by valuating lower-bound parameters with 0 and upper-bound parameters with ∞, then there exists a sufficiently large constant C such that this run exists in v(A) such that v assigns 0 to lowerbound and C to upper-bound parameters. Here, we can trivially pick d, as any clock constraint x ≤ d will be satisfied for a run of duration d. Let v assign 0 to lower-bound and d to upper-bound parameters. Then, there exists a run of duration d such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A), and there exists a run of duration d such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A). Therefore, the set of valuations v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓ priv on the way to ℓ f for a non-empty set of execution times is non empty-which concludes the proof.
Remark 2. The class of L/U-PTAs is known to be relatively meaningful, and many case studies from the literature fit into this class, including case studies proposed even before this class was defined in [Hun+02] . Even though the PTA in Fig. 3 does not fit in this class, it can easily be transformed into an L/U-PTA, by duplicating p into p l (used in lower-bound comparisons with clocks) and p u (used in upper-bound comparisons with clocks).
Parameter synthesis for opacity
Despite the negative theoretical result of Proposition 2, we now address the timed-opacity synthesis problem for the full class of PTAs. Our method may not terminate (due to the undecidability) but, if it does, its result is correct. Our workflow can be summarized as follows.
1. We enrich the original PTA by adding a Boolean flag b and a final synchronization action; 2. We perform self-composition (i. e., parallel composition with a copy of itself) of this modified PTA; 3. We perform reachability-synthesis using EFsynth on ℓ f with contradictory values of b.
We detail each operation in the following. In this section, we assume a PTA A, a given private location ℓ priv and a given final location ℓ f . ℓ1 ℓ2 ℓ3 Enriching the PTA We first add a Boolean flag b initially set to false, and then set to true on any transition leading to ℓ priv (in the line of the proof of Proposition 1). Therefore, b = true denotes that ℓ priv has been visited. Second, we add a synchronization action finish on any transition leading to ℓ f . Third, we add a new clock x abs (never reset) together with a new parameter p abs , and we guard all transitions to ℓ f with x abs = p abs . This will allow to measure the (parametric) execution time. Let Enrich(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) denote this procedure.
Example 9. Fig. 5 shows the transformed version of the PTA in Fig. 3 .
Self-composition
We use here the principle of self-composition, i. e., composing the PTA with a copy of itself. More precisely, given a PTA A ′ = Enrich(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ), we first perform an identical copy of A ′ with distinct variables: that is, a clock x of A ′ is distinct from a clock x in the copy of A ′ -which can be trivially performed using variable renaming.
3 Let Copy(A ′ ) denote this copy of A ′ . We then compute A ′ {finish} Copy(A ′ ). That is, A ′ and Copy(A ′ ) evolve completely independently due to the interleaving-except that they are forced to enter ℓ f at the same time, thanks to the synchronization action finish.
Synthesis Then, we apply reachability synthesis EFsynth (over all parameters, i. e., the "internal" timing parameters, but also the p abs parameter) to the following goal location: the original A ′ is in ℓ f with b = true while its copy Copy(A ′ ) is in ℓ ′ f with b ′ = false (primed variables denote variables from the copy). Intuitively, we synthesize timing parameters and execution times such that there exists a run reaching ℓ f with b = true (i. e., that has visited ℓ priv ) and there exists another run of same duration reaching ℓ f with b = false (i. e., that has not visited ℓ priv ).
Let SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) denote the entire procedure. We formalize SynthOp in Algorithm 1, where "ℓ f ∧ b = true" denotes the location ℓ f with b = true.
Also note that EFsynth is called on a set made of a single location of A Now let us keep all parameters unconstrained. The result of Algorithm 1 is the following 3-dimensional constraint:
Soundness We will state below that, whenever SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) terminates, then its result is an exact (sound and complete) answer to the timedopacity synthesis problem.
Let us first prove a technical lemma used later to prove our the soundness of SynthOp.
Lemma 3. Assume SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) terminates with result K. For all v |= K, there exists a run ending in ℓ f at time v(p abs ) in v(A).
Proof. From the construction of Enrich, we added a new clock x abs (never reset) together with a new parameter p abs , and we guarded all transitions to ℓ f with x abs = p abs . Therefore, valuations of p abs correspond exactly to the times at which ℓ f can be reached in v(A).
We can now prove soundness and completeness.
Proposition 3 (soundness). Assume SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) terminates with result K. For all v |= K, there exists a run of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A) and there exists a run of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A).
Proof. SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) is the result of EFsynth called on the selfcomposition of Enrich(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ). Recall that Enrich has enriched A with the addition of a guard x abs = p abs on the incoming transitions of ℓ f , as well as a Boolean flag b that is true iff ℓ priv was visited along a run. Assume v |= K. From Lemma 1, there exists a run of
From Lemma 3, this run takes v(p abs ) time units. From the self-composition that is made of interleaving only (except for the final synchronization), there exists a run of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A) and there exists a run of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A).
Proposition 4 (completeness)
Proof. Assume SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) terminates with result K. Assume v. Assume there exists a run ρ of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A) and there exists a run ρ ′ of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A).
First, from Enrich, there exists a run ρ of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is reachable (resp. unreachable) on the way to ℓ f in v(A) implies that there exists a run ρ of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ f ∧ b = true (resp. b = false) is reachable in v(Enrich(A)).
Since our self-composition allows any interleaving, runs ρ of v(A ′ ) and ρ ′ in v(Copy(A ′ )) are independent-except for reaching ℓ f . Since ρ and ρ ′ have the same duration v(p abs ), then they both reach ℓ f at the same time and, from our definition of self-composition, they can simultaneously fire action finish and enter ℓ f at time v(p abs ). Hence, there exists a run reaching ℓ f ∧b = true, ℓ
Theorem 2 (correctness). Assume SynthOp(A, ℓ priv , ℓ f ) terminates with result K. Assume v. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a run of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is reachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A) and there exists a run of duration v(p abs ) such that ℓ priv is unreachable on the way to ℓ f in v(A). 2. v |= K.
Proof. From Propositions 3 and 4

Experiments
Experimental environment
We use IMITATOR [And+12], a tool taking as input networks of PTAs extended with several handful features such as shared global discrete variables, PTA synchronization through strong broadcast, etc. IMITATOR represents symbolic states as polyhedra, relying on PPL [BHZ08] .
We ran experiments using IMITATOR 2.10.4 "Butter Jellyfish" (build 2477 HEAD/5b53333) on a Dell XPS 13 9360 equipped with an Intel R Core TM i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz with 8 GiB memory running Linux Mint 18.3 64 bits. 
Translating programs into PTAs
We will consider case studies from the PTA community and from previous works focusing on privacy using (parametric) timed automata. In addition, we will be interested in analyzing programs too. In order to apply our method to the analysis of programs, we need a systematic way of translating a program (e. g., a Java program) into a PTA. In general, precisely modeling the execution time of a program using models like timed automata is highly non-trivial due to complication of hardware pipelining, caching, OS scheduling, etc. The readers are referred to the rich literature in, for instance, [Lv+10] . In this work, we instead make the following simplistic assumption on execution time of a program statement and focus on solving the parameter synthesis problem. How to precisely model the execution time of programs is orthogonal and complementary to our work.
We assume that the execution time of a program statement other than Thread.sleep(n) is within a range [0, ǫ] where ǫ is a small integer constant (in milliseconds), whereas the execution time of statement Thread.sleep(n) is within a range [n, n + ǫ]. In fact, we choose to keep ǫ parametric to be as general as possible, and to not depend on particular architectures.
Our test subject is a set of benchmark programs from the DARPA Space/-Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) program.
5 These programs are being released publicly to facilitate researchers to develop methods and tools for identifying STAC vulnerabilities in the programs.
A richer framework
The symbolic representation of variables and parameters in IMITATOR allows us to reason symbolically concerning variables. That is, instead of enumerating all possible (bounded) values of x and secret in Fig. 3 , we turn them to parameters (i. e., unknown constants), and IMITATOR performs a symbolic reasoning. Even better, the analysis terminates for this example even when no bound is provided on these variables. This is often not possible in (non-parametric) timed automata based model checkers, that usually have to enumerate these values. Therefore, in our PTA representation of Java programs, we turn all user-input variable and secret constant variables to parameters. Other local variables are implemented using IMITATOR discrete (shared, global) variables.
We also discuss how to enlarge the scope of our framework. Multiple private locations This can be easily achieved by setting b to true along any incoming transition of one of these private locations.
Multiple final locations
The technique used depends on whether these multiple final locations can be distinguished or not. If they are indistinguishable (i. e., the observer knows when the program has terminated, but not in which state), then it suffices to merge all these final locations in a single one, and our framework trivially applies. If they are distinguishable, then one analysis needs to be conducted on each of these locations (with a different parameter p abs for each of these), and the obtained constraints must be intersected.
Access to high-level variables In the literature, a distinction is sometimes made between low-level ("public") and high-level ("private") variables. Opacity or non-interference can be defined in terms of the ability for an observer to deduce some information on the high-level variables.
Example 11. For example, in Fig. 6 (where cl is a clock and h a variable), if ℓ 2 is reachable in 20 time units, then it is clear that the value of the high-level variable h is negative.
Our framework can also be used to address this problem, e. g., by setting b to true, not on locations but on selected tests / assignments of such variables.
Example 12. For example, setting b to true on the upper transition from ℓ 1 to ℓ 2 in Fig. 6 , the answer to the timed-opacity computation problem is D = (30, ∞), and the system is therefore not opaque since ℓ 2 can be reached for any execution time in [0, ∞).
Experiments
Benchmarks As a proof of concept, we applied our method to a set of examples from the literature. The first five models come from previous works from the literature [GMR07; Ben+15a; VNN18], also addressing non-interference or opacity in timed automata.
6 In addition, we used two common models from the (P)TA literature, not necessarily linked to security: a toy coffee machine (Coffee) used as benchmark in a number of papers, and a model Fischer's mutual exclusion protocol (Fischer-HRSV02) [Hun+02] . In both cases, we added manually a definition of private location (the number of sugars ordered, and the identity of the process entering the critical section, respectively), and we verified whether they are opaque w.r.t. these internal behaviors.
We also applied our approach to a set of Java programs from the aforementioned STAC library. We use identifiers of the form STAC:1:n where 1 denotes the identifier in the library, while n (resp. v) denotes non-vulnerable (resp. vulnerable). We manually translated these programs to parametric timed automata, following the method described in Section 8.2. We used a representative set of programs from the library; however, some of them were too complex to fit in our framework, notably when the timing leaks come from calls to external libraries (STAC:15:v), when dealing with complex computations such as operations on matrices (STAC:16:v) or when handling probabilities (STAC:18:v). Proposing efficient and accurate ways to represent arbitrary programs into (parametric) timed automata is orthogonal to our work, and is the object of future works.
Timed-opacity computation First, we verified whether a given TA model is opaque, i. e., if for all execution times reaching a given final location, both an execution passes by a given private location and an execution does not pass by this private location. To this end, we also answer the timed-opacity computation problem, i. e., to synthesize all execution times for which the system is opaque. While this problem can be verified on the region graph (Proposition 1), we use the same framework as in Section 7, but without parameters in the original TA. That is, we use the Boolean flag b and the parameter p abs to compute all possible execution times. In other words, we use a parametric analysis to solve a non-parametric problem.
We tabulate the experiments results in Table 1 . We give from left to right the model name, the numbers of automata and of clocks in the original timed automaton (this information is not relevant for Java programs as the original model is not a TA), the numbers of automata, of clocks and of parameters in the transformed PTA, the computation time in seconds (for the timed-opacity computation problem), and the result. In the result column, "×" (resp. " √ ") denotes that the model is opaque (resp. is not opaque), while "( √ )" denotes that the model is not opaque, but could be fixed. That is, although DReach
¬ℓpriv (ℓ f ), their intersection is non-empty and therefore, by tuning the computation time, it may be possible to make the system opaque. This will be discussed in Section 8.5.
Even though we are interested here in timed opacity computation (and not in synthesis), note that all models derived from Java programs feature the parameter ǫ. The result is obtained by variable elimination, i. e., by existential quantification over the parameters different from p abs . In addition, the number of parameters is increased by the parameters encoding the symbolic variables (such as x and secret in Fig. 3 ). Discussion Overall, our method is able to answer the timed-opacity computation problem relatively fast, exhibiting which execution times are opaque (timedopacity computation problem), and whether all execution times indeed guarantee opacity (timed-opacity problem). In many cases, while the system is not opaque, we are able to infer the execution times guaranteeing opacity (cells marked "( √ )"). This is an advantage of our method w.r.t. methods outputting only binary answers.
We observed some mismatches in the Java programs, i. e., some programs marked n (non-vulnerable) in the library are actually vulnerable according to our method. This mainly comes from the fact that the STAC library uses some statistical analyses on the execution times, while we use an exact method. Therefore, a very small mismatch between DReach v(A) ℓpriv (ℓ f ) and DReach v(A) ¬ℓpriv (ℓ f ) will lead our algorithm to answer "not opaque", while statistical methods may not be able to differentiate this mismatch from noise. This is notably the case of STAC:14:n where some action lasts either 5,010,000 or 5,000,000 time units depending on some secret, which our method detects to be different, while the library does not. For STAC:1:n, using our data, the difference in the execution time upper bound between an execution performing some secret action and an execution not performing it is larger than 1 %, which we believe is a value which is not negligible, and therefore this case study might be considered as vulnerable. For STAC:4:n, we used a different definition of opacity (whether the user has input the correct password, vs. information on the real password), which explains the mismatch.
Concerning the Java programs, we decided to keep the most abstract representation, by imposing that each instruction lasts for a time in [0, ǫ], with ǫ a parameter. However, fixing an identical (parametric) time ǫ for all instructions, or fixing an arbitrary time in a constant interval [0, ǫ] (for some constant ǫ, e. g., 1), or even fixing an identical (constant) time ǫ (e. g., 1) for all instructions, significantly speeds up the analysis. These choices can be made for larger models.
Timed opacity synthesis Then, we address the timed-opacity synthesis problem. In this case, we synthesize both the execution time and the internal values of the parameters for which one cannot deduce private information from the execution time.
We consider the same case studies as for timed-opacity computation; however, the Java programs feature no internal "parameter" and cannot be used here. Still, we artificially enriched one of them (STAC:3:v) as follows: in addition to the parametric value of ǫ and the execution time, we parameterized one of the sleep timers. The resulting constraint can help designers to refine this latter value to ensure opacity.
We tabulate the results in Table 2 , where the columns are similar to Table 1 . A difference is that the first |P| column denotes the number of parameters in the original model (without counting these added by our transformation). In addition, Table 2 does not contain a "vulnerable?" column as we synthesize the condition for which the model is non-vulnerable, and therefore the answer is nonbinary. However, in the last column ("Constraint"), we make explicit whether no valuations ensure opacity ("⊥"), all of them ("⊤"), or some of them ("K").
Discussion An interesting outcome is that the computation time is comparable to the (non-parametric) timed-opacity computation, with an increase of up to 20 % only. In addition, for all case studies, we exhibit at least some valuations for which the system can be made opaque. Also note that our method always terminates for these models, and therefore the result exhibited is complete. Interestingly, Coffee is opaque for any valuation of the 3 internal parameters.
8.5 "Repairing" a non-opaque PTA Our method gives a result in time of a union of polyhedra over the internal timing parameters and the execution time. On the one hand, we believe tuning the internal timing parameters should be easy: for a program, an internal timing parameter can be the duration of a sleep, for example. On the other hand, tuning the execution time of a program may be more subtle. A solution is to enforce a minimal execution time by adding a second thread in parallel with a Wait() primitive to ensure a minimal execution time. Ensuring a maximal execution time can be achieved with an exception stopping the program after a given time; however there is a priori no guarantee that the result of the computation is correct.
Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an approach based on parametric timed model checking to not only decide whether the model of a timed system can be subject to timing information leakage, but also to synthesize internal timing parameters and execution times that render the system opaque. We implemented our approach in a framework based on IMITATOR, and performed experiments on case studies from the literature and from a library of Java programs. We now discuss future works in the following.
Theory We proved decidability of the timed-opacity computation problem for TAs, but we only provided an upper bound (EXPSPACE) on the complexity. It can be easily shown that this problem is at least PSPACE, but the exact complexity remains to be exhibited. In addition, the decidability of the one-clock case remains open: that is, is the timed-opacity emptiness problem decidable for PTAs containing a single clock? Our method consists in duplicating the automaton and adding a clock that is never reset, thus resulting in a PTA with 3 clocks, for which reachabilityemptiness is undecidable [AHV93] . However, since one of the clocks is never reset, and since the automaton is structurally constrained (it is the result of the composition of two copies of the same automaton), decidability might be envisioned.
Finally, while we proved for the class of L/U-PTAs the decidability of the timed-opacity emptiness problem, i. e., the non-existence of a valuation for which the system is opaque, our result does not necessarily mean that exact (complete) synthesis is possible. In fact, some results for L/U-PTAs were proved to be such that the emptiness is decidable but the synthesis is intractable: that is notably the case of reachability-emptiness, which is decidable [Hun+02] while synthesis is intractable [JLR15] . Therefore, studying the timed-opacity synthesis problem remains to be done for L/U-PTAs.
Applications The translation of the STAC library required some non-trivial creativity: while the translation from programs to quantitative extensions of automata is orthogonal to our work, proposing automated translations of (possibly annotated) programs to timed automata dedicated to timing analysis is on our agenda.
Adding probabilities to our framework will be interesting, helping to quantify the execution times of "untimed" instructions in program with a finer grain than an interval; also note that some benchmarks make use of probabilities (notably STAC:18:v).
Finally, IMITATOR is a general model checker, not specifically aimed at solving the problem we address here. Notably, constraints managed by PPL contain all variables (clocks, timing parameters, and parameters encoding symbolic variables of programs), yielding an exponential complexity. Separating certain types of independent variables (typically parameters encoding symbolic variables of programs, and other variables) should highly increase efficiency. 
